ABSTRACT
The Imperial Japanese Navy’s use of air power in the role of a ‘naval air force’ during the Second World War has been well studied. In fact, the air attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent naval battle off Malaya Peninsula are recognised as the key turning points that pushed air power toward centre stage in naval battles, replacing the traditional battleship-oriented naval power philosophy that had dominated the Imperial Navy since its birth. In addition, we can see a similar change and many signs and traces of hardship on the transformation within the Imperial Army. During the offensive air operation over Malaya, Imperial Army Aviation tried to be an ‘independent army air force’ growing out of the traditional concept of operations that emphasised supporting ground forces by reconnaissance and close air support, etc. When the Malaya offensive air operation started, Imperial Army air power could only reach northern Malaya owing to the insufficient combat radius of aircraft operating from original deployment airfields in southern French Indo-China. However, within only a few days, Imperial Army Aviation gained almost complete air superiority over Malaya utilising the tactics of ‘aerial exterminating action’ and occupying airfields one by one in the Malaya peninsula. This initial successful operation significantly contributed to the subsequent Imperial Army land campaigns in Singapore, Java, Sumatra and Burma. The Japanese official war history series praised these Imperial Army Aviation tactics as a historic precedent that was equal to the Imperial Navy’s Hawaii operation.1
