ABSTRACT

This chapter deals with the claim that the decline of the institution of multilateralism 1 is but a logical outcome of the present distribution of international power (Krauthammer 1991). This claim is inspired by power materialist approaches which assume both a significant impact of international structural change on state behaviour, and that institutions are ultimately just a reflection of the distribution of state power. 2 In case of a large power preponderance, the leading state can be logically expected to pursue a policy of primacy which maximizes its foreign policy autonomy (Huntington 1993b). It will guard itself from international institutions that acquire an autonomous dynamic antithetical to its power position. In such a circumstance, it would unilaterally bypass or retreat from them in order to reassert its primacy. 3 Since multilateralism is an institution based on generalized principles and diffuse reciprocity — hence diluting exceptionalist prerogatives simply based on power — it almost by definition clashes with a strategy of primacy. For, although (defensive) realists can envisage the increased use of multilateralism in order to reassure other states (Mastanduno 1997), the institution of multilateralism requires the leading power to curtail its autonomy and capabilities. It will have to forgo part of its power, if not its preponderance, in the name of its own security and world order (Hoffmann 1978, Jervis 1993). This being unlikely, or so the argument goes for power-oriented realists, common principles will yield to power when primacy faces multilateralism.