ABSTRACT
The appreciation and ensuing call for protection of the life forms beyond – or besides – humans has a complex cultural history, which is deeply embedded in religious and philosophical as well as scientific and mundane contexts (e.g. Meyer-Abich 1997; Worster 1995). From the beginning of the 1990s, the term “biodiversity” has become the umbrella concept for most of the issues dealt with before under the rubrics of, among others, “nature protection” and “nature conservation“ (Myers 1979), but with decisive new implications (Potthast 1996; Takacs 1996; see also below). With the United Nations’ “Convention on Biological Diversity” (CBD; UN 1992), biodiversity became an accepted good to be protected in terms of international law and its national implementations, as well. But, philosophically speaking, what kinds of values are being attached to the multiplicity of life forms? From the perspective of moral philosophy but also of epistemology, this chapter will explore the diverse notions of values related to biodiversity. Firstly, conceptual clarifications will be made regarding the twin terms ethics/morals and value/price. Then the invention of the term “biodiversity” as a science-policy concept in the context of the Convention on Biological Diversity is sketched and its status will be characterised as an epistemic-moral hybrid, which is to be explained in some detail. The diversity of values attached to biodiversity will be analysed with regard to three important general issues of moral philosophy: a) the current situation and groundwork for a future possible axiology of values, b) the contested physiocentric extension of the moral community, and c) the limits and problems of economic valorisation depending on different understandings of “value”. It shall be shown that philosophical issues have major repercussions on practical questions. An open concept of values, although advantageous in many ways, appears to have two major shortcomings: i) The reduction of values to individual preferences only makes sense for a restricted neoclassic economic and utilitarian ethics approach to moral issues; it neglects all aspects of biodiversity beyond preferences and might foster an alienation in human-nature relationships by commodification and monetarisation. ii) The opaqueness of the notion of values does not give criteria for weighing up in order to guide developing moral rules and specific decisions. However, the multiple values of biodiversity can at the same time be regarded as providing common moral ground – despite differences in detail – for joint environmental decisions and governance. Furthermore, they can serve as a starting point to once again address questions of axiology beyond preference aggregation, which have been neglected by moral philosophy ever since the metaphysics-based attempts had been discarded. Investigating the values of biodiversity elucidates the necessary link between practical activities to protect the diminishing multiplicity of life forms and philosophical clarification as to how and why we can and should give good reasons for such an endeavour.
