ABSTRACT
Hume's rejection of causal powers, including a variety of such powers conceived by philosophers from Aristotle to John Locke, has served as a defining moment in the history of dispositions theories. Hume's role as a standard opponent of dispositions theorists needs major revision. This chapter aims to develop a better understanding of Hume's role in the history of dispositions theories by analyzing his belief-determining dispositions and by formulating a Humean-style metaphysical argument for the existence of extrinsic causal dispositions. It shows how Hume's negative epistemological argument rejecting intrinsic causal powers is supported by this metaphysical argument endorsing extrinsic causal dispositions. The chapter discusses Hume's modeling of his dispositional ideas on certain basic principles of Newtonian physics. It explains why the two types of dispositions endorsed in Hume's epistemology and metaphysics establish the contingent necessity of matters of fact, and how this contingent necessity structures his deterministic explanations of both human action and the physical motions of material objects.
