ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to investigate the question of what work can be done by the notion of dispositions in a specific context within the philosophy of science. It considers one profound consequence of dispositional realism in this arena: the prospect of a positive transformation in discussions regarding how best to formulate the idea of scientific realism itself. The chapter examines a second benefit of disposition realism: the prospect of an economical unification of the core metaphysical presuppositions of this newly synthesized position. It explores last virtue of dispositional realism: the prospect of resolving a pressing challenge to scientific realism in the form of the use of inconsistent models in scientific practice. The chapter provides some brief reflections on the dialectic between dispositional realists and antirealists in light of the explanatory virtues. Scientific realism, to a rough, first approximation, is the view that scientific theories correctly describe both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world.
