ABSTRACT
Criminological research has tended to adopt an economic model of reasoned/rational decision making (e.g. Clarke and Felson, 1993; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985), despite growing recognition amongst psychologists that many decisions also involve intuitive/emotive processes (see Evans and Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2003, 2012; Sloman, 1996). This, it may be argued, has limited criminology's ability to adequately frame, and consequently address, the cognitive processes leading to the decision to offend. Intuitive/emotive processes have implications for habitual behaviours, which may characterize a considerable proportion of criminal acts (Wikström and Treiber, 2009b), as well as our understanding of the role of affect (emotions, moods and visceral states; see Van Gelder et al., Chapter 9, this volume) in criminal decision making.
