ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the authors argues that Leibniz should be considered an idealist from his 'middle years' on and that talk of corporeal substances can be explained in terms of the true elements of Leibniz's ontology: monads or simple substances. Moreover, while Glenn Hartz may very well be correct about the tensions in Leibniz's metaphysics, he argues that these tensions might actually be reasons to adopt an idealist reading of Leibniz. Hartz claims that there is a 'Philosophical Argument' in favor of idealism and against corporeal substance. There is no doubt that some of Leibniz's best statements of his philosophy are to be found in his major correspondences––especially those with Arnauld, De Volder, Des Bosses, and Clarke. At times, however, even these writings contain apparent contradictions or show Leibniz wrestling with deep problems in his philosophy and working through various options.
