ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author deals with Edwin McCann's interpretation of John Locke, which in turn arbitrates an earlier critical dispute between Margaret Wilson and Michael Ayers. Locke says that angels or the like could do this with corporeal things. Both Robert Boyle and Locke emphasize that the rest of the universe would have to be taken into account in order to determine all the powers of a body. Matthew Stuart, who also denies that Locke endorses essentialism, attempts a reconstrual of the point of Locke's analogy with geometry, according to which it represents, roughly, a mere commitment to deductivism about explanation. The best way to zero in on the difference between our two interpretations is to spell out the tension in Locke this way––Locke appears to be committed to an inconsistent triad: Boylean corpuscularianism and Essentialism. The author utilizes "mechanism" and "corpuscularianism" interchangeably.
