ABSTRACT
This part introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters. The part argues that two main claims: Leibniz is genuinely committed both to idealism and to the existence of corporeal substance; and Leibniz holds these two inconsistent commitments as a result of deep tensions in his system. It analyzes some key pieces of textual evidence and shows that their commitment to corporeal substance is merely apparent. Was Leibniz an idealist who thought that the only things that really exist are minds? Or did he also believe that 'corporeal substances' like animals—compounds of mind and body—exist? The question itself is clear, and it's about a fundamental part of Leibniz's system. But many of Leibniz's readers have found that it's actually very difficult. In a number of books, articles, and letters written at different points in his career, Leibniz says that only minds exist.
