ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author explores the non–trivial danger of misuse of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and examines the validity of Della Rocca's inference from the unavailability of explanations of facts to the rejection of the same facts. The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca's outstanding Spinoza book is that at the very center of Spinoza's philosophy stands the PSR. Della Rocca presents the view he attempts to rule out––that for Spinoza some mental states are representational while others are not––and asks by virtue of what both representational and non–representational states are mental. Della Rocca's focus on the question of whether God could privilege one finite mode over the other leads him to misformulate Spinoza's critique of divine teleology. Spinoza does not limit his critique of divine teleology to the rejection of divine action for the sake of a finite thing; rather, for Spinoza, God acts for the sake of no one, not even for His own sake.
