ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that Nicolas Malebranche in fact gets it right: his philosophical opponents, and a key strand of scholasticism in particular, do indeed hold that causation requires logical, not nomological, necessitation. It shows that Malebranche's dismissal of bodies as causes makes sense only if the requisite tie between cause and effect involves intentionality. The chapter suggests that the typical Aristotelian position holds that sublunary events are linked by what we would call logical necessity: it is a contradiction, and hence inconceivable, that a cause not produce its effect. Occasionalism is a highly counter–intuitive doctrine, and Malebranche surely thinks that he has powerful considerations to advance on its behalf. Malebranche rejects the attribution of powers to bodies on the grounds that esse–ad amounts to intentionality, a feature only minds possess. The flip side of this, however, is that Malebranche accepts the need for precisely the kind of connection intentionality alone can provide.
