Previous research on radical right voting in Western Europe has suggested that people from lower social classes are over-represented in the radical right electorate. Betz (1994) even speaks of a proletarization of the radical right electoral base. The disproportionate amount of workers from the lower classes among radical right voters has been explained by economic, cultural, and political grievances (Ivarsflaten 2008; see also Oesch 2008). Briefly, the economic explanations refer to people of the lower classes as being in competition with immigrants over scare resources (including housing, jobs, and social welfare benefits) and as the main victims of economic globalization and dislocation, which leads them to be more likely to agree with radical right parties’ ideas about the restriction of immigration and rejection of economic modernization (Oesch 2008). The cultural explanation contends that people from the lower social classes, who generally have lower cognitive skills, feel more threatened by different social and cultural changes, including the move toward a multicultural society and the presence of foreign cultures and immigration. Hence, they are inclined to turn to radical right parties, which represent the authoritarian response to the dominance of libertarian values and multicultural society (Ignazi 2003). Finally, the political grievance explanation argues that being confronted with unemployment and stagnating income, and dissatisfaction with the way traditional (left-wing) parties have handled the weakening economic position of workers, people from the lower classes are anticipated to be attracted by radical right parties’ rhetoric against mainstream politics and politicians (Betz 1993).