ABSTRACT
Democracies cannot function without some minimal level of loyalty or affection. Loyalty and affection are necessary if systems are to be able to cope with the fact that many political decisions are, almost by definition, characterized as zero-sum games; this is a stylish way of saying that citizens cannot expect to get what they want unless somebody picks up the bill. Without a minimum attachment to the way political decisions are taken, unfulfilled demands and the obligation to meet the costs of social arrangements will gradually result in discontent, frustration, protest, or withdrawal. This notion has been a platitude among scholars and observers of political systems at least since Lane (1959b) and Almond and Verba (1963) presented their seminal work on the fragile balance between legitimacy and effectiveness, on the one hand, and the features of civic culture on the other hand. According to this line of argument, a democracy can only withstand the centripetal forces of sustained rivalry, the preponderance of group interests, and the rising frustrations of minorities if it enjoys a minimum level of loyalty and affection from citizens.
