ABSTRACT
In 2005, Jordan’s Prime Minister proposed legislation that would have limited the opposition-led professional associations’ (PAs’) activities to purely professional ones, taken greater control of their financial and disciplinary matters, and amended their electoral system, among other initiatives. Any of these, if implemented, would have severely diminished the PAs’ political and financial power and influence, and consequently, the oppositions’ abilities to press political demands. The legislation, however, was never brought for a final vote in parliament, but the threat nevertheless worked. Despite the PAs’ strength, as witnessed by their massive demonstrations and presumably public support, the PAs restrained themselves – undertaking fewer political activities and quieting their demands. Political activities have continued, but they are generally less provocative and, with some exceptions, even during the 2011 Arab Spring, not been aimed at inciting the street. The question is why. Given that the government did not follow through on its threat or on an early one in 1996 (Nevo, 2001) why did they dampen their activities? Conversely, if the PAs are so strong, why did the government retreat from the legislation? Finally, what can the freezing of the 2005 law tell us about state–society relations in Jordan and in authoritarian regimes of the Arab world in general?
