ABSTRACT
Embodied semantics states that concepts are represented within the same sensory-motor circuitry that processes experiences of that concept (Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; Damasio and Tranel, 1993; Feldman and Narayanan, 2004; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002a; Pulvermüller, 2005; Pulvermüller et al., 2005). For example, the concept of “throwing” would be represented in sensory-motor areas that represent throwing actions; the concept of “red” would be represented by sensory areas that are involved in color processing; and so forth. It has also been posited that metaphors may also be represented in the same manner. For example, the metaphor “bite off more than you can chew” would involve the motor representations related to biting and chewing (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As metaphorical speech is speculated to dominate a large portion of human thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), embodied semantics, thus, would be a framework for much of human language and thought.
