ABSTRACT
Philosopher Joshua Greene and psychologist Jonathan Haidt have argued that experiments based on variations of a class of thought experiments known as “trolley problems” demonstrate not only that some regions of the brain are correlated with moral reasoning but also that emotion and reason are at odds when it comes to a moral agent's ability to navigate ethical dilemmas. 1 Although Greene and Haidt differ on the “normative direction” the research should take, they both believe that neuroscience should play a central role in the development of contemporary normative ethics. 2 The claim that specific regions of the brain are activated in the process of moral deliberation is a fairly uncontroversial empirical finding—and the idea that our reason and affect may be at odds when we encounter various moral dilemmas also seems to correspond well to our prima facie moral intuitions. However, the assertion that neuroscience should be determinative with regard to the direction of normative ethics seems to move beyond the proper scope of neuroscience—and it is this at this point we can ask to what extent can, or should, empirical data alter normative theory? In what follows, I will focus primarily on Greene's elaboration of the data and how he employs it in defense of his own normative claims.
