ABSTRACT
The past decade has witnessed renewed interest in the scientific study of morality, both by scientists and by the wider public. This renewed interest, driven in part by advances in neuroscience and the development of new fields and methods of inquiry, has re-ignited thinking about the relation between descriptive scientific accounts of morality and normative moral theory, with some suggesting that the “is” of the science of morality should impact, or perhaps determine, the content of the “ought” of moral theory. The findings of the scientists have in turn prompted much discussion on the part of philosophers and theologians on precisely this matter, a discussion that in many ways is still in its infancy. This renewed interest in a science of morality comes amid an ongoing renaissance of virtue theoretic approaches to ethics, and while some thinkers working in the science of morality have engaged in some modest reflection on virtue theory, a deeper engagement has yet to occur. 1 This is especially true with respect to reflection on moral exemplarity, a concept which has played an oft-important role in virtue theoretic accounts of ethics, but it has been almost completely ignored in modern ethical theory.
