The decade long Maoist armed conflict formally came to an end in 2006 with the peace settlement between the government of Nepal and the rebels, but ethnic mobilization and conflicts, which surged forward in Nepal after the restoration of democracy in 1990, have further increased since 2006. The largely peaceful identity movements of the 1990s became more violent after the turn of the century: an organization of indigenous nationalities launched an armed insurgency in the late 1990s in the eastern hills, and dozens of armed groups have arisen in the hills and Tarai after the turn of the century. These movements, based on ethnicity, language, caste, religion, and regio-

nal identity, have become increasingly central players on the contemporary political stage, reshaping debates on the definition of the Nepali nation, nationalism and the structure of the Nepali state. Members of the traditional dominant group still lead the polity but they can no longer ignore marginalized identity groups. In fact, groups like the Madhesis have begun to wield disproportionate power in the making and unmaking of the governments and in coalitional politics after the 2008 election. This volume describes these identity movements and their evolution in the two decades following the 1990 People’s Movement. This book represents the first comparative analysis of identity-based

movements in Nepal. It contains chapters on the Madhesi (regional, linguistic), Muslim (religious), Dalit (caste) and indigenous nationalities (linguistic, ethnic, religious) movements as well chapters that compare the movements. By analyzing these diverse movements within a single volume, and within some chapters in the volume, we aim to provide data to allow for the methodologically rigorous production of generalizations about the formation of movements and the differences between movements. Nepal fits the global pattern in which democratic transitions are often

accompanied by the mobilization of ethnic groups. While the media and some scholars have viewed identity movements as undermining democratization (Snyder 2000), this is a misperception. Identity movements have the potential to expand and deepen democracy by pushing for states that are more equitable in their distribution of resources and power among their citizens (Hangen 2010; Lawoti 2005; Van Cott 2005). Because identities are enmeshed

in structures of economic and political inequality, efforts to expand economic opportunities and access to political power must work with and through identity categories. In this volume, we examine the complex and overlapping identity claims and movements that have become an intrinsic part of the democratization process in Nepal. Identity politics have intensified in Nepal over the past two decades, in the

context of considerable political upheavals. The armed conflict between Maoist rebels and the state that lasted from 1996 to 2006 left more than 13,000 people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. In the midst of the war, the massacre of King Birendra and his immediate family in 2001 created further instability. King Gyanendra dismissed an elected government in 2002 and in February 2005 seized direct control of the country. A second people’s movement in April 2006 re-claimed democracy, and a peace accord was signed in November 2006. Elections to a Constituent Assembly were held in April 2008 and the process of drafting a new constitution commenced. Between the people’s movement of 1990 and the second people’s movement

of 2006, identity politics became increasingly influential, leading to new kinds of political demands. In 1990, people called for the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a reduction of the role of the monarchy in politics. By 2006, they were demanding an entirely new state structure – a federal republic, and a secular state. Since 2006, new actors and organizations (ethnic political parties, fronts and armed groups) have emerged and some of them have emphasized a different and more confrontational set of protest activities such as general strikes (bandhs) and violent actions. The escalation of these forms of political action has begun to change the nature of identity movements and Nepali politics and society. The demands of newly mobilized identity groups became a major concern

of the state during the drafting of the interim constitution in 2006 and 2007 and the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. These issues have remained a source of disagreement within the Constituent Assembly. Addressing identity issues in the constitution will be necessary for establishing and maintaining a functioning democratic state in the future. This book aims to understand the rapid rise in ethnic and nationalist

mobilization, the dynamics and trajectories of these movements, and their consequences for Nepal. First, the chapters offer cultural, political and sociological approaches to understanding the roots of mobilization and conflicts, the increase in mobilization and violent activities, and the political and social effects of these movements. The papers included here analyze how identities intersect with forms of political and economic inequality, and how these movements have framed issues, constructed new forms of national, ethnic, caste, religious and regional identities, and challenged dominant forms of identities. As these articles demonstrate, these new identities are complex, internally diverse and often overlap with other identity groups. Second, the chapters will help to test theories of ethnic and nationalist

mobilization with Nepal’s semi-laboratory conditions. Nepal’s various

linguistic, ethnic/national, religious, caste and regional groups have mobilized to different extents, from attempting to establish a common identity to demanding separation through violent means. By examining these diverse movements within a unitary state, in which there are constant state policies and socio-economic conditions, the book will illuminate factors that are more salient for the mobilization of identity groups. For instance, does the extent of elite formation or the varying emphasis on territory among different groups explain different levels of mobilization? To what extent does the state’s treatment of and response to different groups explain the mobilization patterns and strategies of different identity movements?