ABSTRACT
There are various ways that a dispositionalist could go when constructing a theory of causation based on an ontology of real dispositions or what some prefer to call powers. In this paper, we will try to spell out what we take to be the most promising version of causal dispositionalism. The broad aim is to get causes from powers. Many people share this aim and, as Molnar has already said, one of the reasons to accept an ontology of powers is the work powers can do in explaining a host of other problems, causation being among them (Molnar 2003: 186). The delivery of a plausible powers-based theory of causation is, however, overdue. So far we have only hints and false starts (Harré and Madden 1975, Bhaskar 1975, Cartwright 1989, Molnar 2003: ch. 12, Martin 2008: ch. 5). None of these accounts have gone quite in the right direction, in our view, so our ambition here is to set out the first few steps.
