ABSTRACT
The first wave of enthusiasm for Internet-based visions of digital democracy were largely predicated upon the desire to produce virtual public spheres (Loader 1997; Tsagarousianou et al. 1998; Blumler and Gurevitch 2001). Democratic governance, it was contended, could be significantly improved through the open and equal deliberation between citizens, representatives and policy-makers afforded by the new information and communications technologies. For cyberlibertarians this could even be achieved without the need for governments (Barlow 1996). For left-of-centre progressives it could enable stronger participatory democracy through the emergence of online agoras and Habermasian forums (Habermas 1962/1989; Hague and Loader 1999). The history of science and technology provides many instances of the fanfare of transformative rhetoric which accompanies the emergence of ‘new’ innovations which are then often followed by disappointment and more measured appraisal (Bijker et al. 1987). So perhaps it should have been little surprise that the utopian perspectives of the first generation of digital democracy were quickly replaced by findings that documented the myopia of such visions (Hill and Hughes 1998; Wilhelm 2000). Instead of transforming representative democracy the new media, as Hill and Hughes suggested, was more likely to be shaped by the existing entrenched social and economic interests of contemporary societies (ibid., p. 182). By the turn of the millennium a more accurate picture of the influence of the Internet upon democratic governance was emerging as the technologies were understood as part of the mundane activities of ‘everyday life’ (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002). Here was to be found the factionalism, prejudice and abuse which have all too often mired the aspirations of deliberative decision-making (Doctor and Dutton 1998). But perhaps more significantly, the very idea of a virtual Habermasian public sphere was subjected to extensive critiques from cultural studies scholars (McKee 2005) and feminist theorists (van Zoonen 2005). They have revealed how such models of deliberative democracy frequently privilege a particular style of ‘rational’ communication that largely favours white wealthy males to the exclusion of other identities (Pateman 1989; Fraser 1990).
