ABSTRACT
In the political science literature, a rich body of research on Europeanization has emerged, which, in its dominant form, sheds light on the various ways in which political integration with the European Union (EU) affects the member states’ policy and institutional arrangements (see, e.g., Börzel and Risse 2003; Knill 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). A central finding of this research perspective is that national factors, such as the preferences of domestic veto players, are essential for explaining the varying degrees of policy and institutional change in the member states (see, e.g., Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; König and Luetgert 2009). Typically, Europeanization studies discuss the occurrence of events of policy and institutional change in the context of effective compliance with EU law. Compliance with EU law is of a high practical relevance since otherwise, the single market—that is, the centerpiece of the European integration project—cannot function properly (Kelemen 2000).
