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Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism
DOI link for Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism
Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism book
Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism
DOI link for Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism
Are preferences for real? Choice theory, folk psychology, and the hard case for commonsensible realism book
ABSTRACT
And yet there is a sense in which preferences and beliefs belong to our ordinary world view, for we constantly use them (and related concepts, like ‘desire’) to explain our actions and those of fellow human beings. This idea is not new. A century ago economists like Ludwig von Mises noticed that the explanatory strategy of economics is on a par with ordinary explanations of human action. And the source of Donald Davidson’s famous qualms with decision theory in the 1960s was the latter’s continuity with folk psychology.2