Introduction Peru’s ex peri ence with the Shining Path guerrillas between 1980 and the mid1990s is a textbook case of an implacably milit ant insurgent organ iza tion determined to overthrow the gov ern ment by force, a so-called “people’s war” in which neither party was ever willing to con sider nego ti ations as an exit strat egy.1 Nevertheless, it was the gov ern ment rather than the guerrillas that was able to adjust its strat egy and tactics to emerge victorious at the very time when Shining Path appeared to be on the verge of success. In a con text of gen eralized polit ical viol ence in the late 1980s, the gov ern ment formed an elite police unit to track the guerrilla leadership. At the same time, the milit ary undertook a complete review of its counter-insurgency approach to that point and adopted a new strategy to reach out to the local popu la tion for the first time. The turning point in the conflict occurred in Septem ber, 1992, when the police captured Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, Shining Path’s founder and maximum leader. Such a dev ast ating psychological blow to an organ iza tion that had appeared invincible to that point gave the gov ern ment an ad vant age it never relinquished. For instance, the milit ary’s “hearts and minds” cam paign, already well underway, gained new momentum. In addition, the gov ern ment initiated a number of conciliatory meas ures and non-violent post-capture initiatives, including rural micro-development programs, rapid trials by “faceless judges,” and a “repentance law” to encourage milit ants to turn themselves in, that were also instrumental in defanging Shining Path. A Truth and Recon cili ation Commission (CVR),2 estab lished several years later, was intended to assist the largely indi gen ous rural popu la tions most affected by the viol ence to begin to overcome the trauma of the abuses committed by both sides. Such a turn to non-violent approaches became pos sible only after Guzmán’s capture, trial, and conviction, a de velopment that could occur only after the gov ern ment itself had shifted to a more nuanced counter-insurgency strat egy. Overall, while these non-violent and conciliatory initiatives were not crucial for defeating the Shining Path as an insurgent organ iza tion, they never the less con trib uted to the restoration of gov ern ment control and legitimacy by responding to distinct arenas of pop ular concern – rapid and effect ive justice, reincorporation into soci ety

of former Shining Path sympathizers, de velopment resources for the poorest, and, eventually, official re cog ni tion of the need to assist the vic tims of the conflict. The chapter proceeds by explaining how it was that such a violent movement could arise in a demo cratic con text and why the gov ern ment had such little success in stemming the pro gressive expansion of Shining Path for more than a decade. It then details the various elements that together con trib uted to shift the momentum from the insurgents to the gov ern ment, focusing par ticu larly on how the state adjusted while the guerrillas did not. The shifts de scribed include the major change in counter-insurgency strat egy that produced the turning point in the conflict with the capture of Shining Path’s main leader and the organ iza tion’s master files. Discussion then turns to the various non-violent initiatives that slowly restored gov ern ment authority and secur ity across most of the coun try and reduced Shining Path to a vestige of its former capa city. The chapter ends on a cautionary note in light of in dica tions that the current gov ern ment is not fully committed to the final stages of the recon cili ation process.