Introduction Following 9/11 the notion of recon cili ation with terrorists seemed unthinkable. The chapters of this book have never the less inquired into pro cesses of engagement with sub-state groups conceived of as ‘terrorists’ and examined the potential gains and prob lems of such initiatives. This last chapter wants to conclude the arguments advanced in this volume by briefly reflecting on the relationship between recon cili ation initiatives and sub-state terrorism in two parts. The first section will review the preceding chapters and draw out some tent at ive conclusions in regard to the two research questions that were raised in the introduction to this volume: (1) Whether or not recon cili ation is a pos sible strat egy for dealing with and ending a ‘terrorist’ conflict. (2) How ‘terrorism’ by sub-state actors influences a pro cess of recon cili ation and vice versa. The second part of the chapter will then take some of the insights gained from the first section and apply them to the idea of recon cili ation in Afghanistan and the wider terrorist conflict commonly referred to as the ‘war on terror’. By focusing on discourse it will show that while recon cili ation with both the Taliban and al Qaeda was considered im pos sible under the Bush administration, the consti tu tion of the Taliban changed during the Obama administration and made engagement with them possible. Recon cili ation with al Qaeda, how ever, remains absurd. Here, the example of recon cili ation in Afghanistan will be used to further illus trate how discourse and the ‘terrorist’ label influence our understanding of recon cili ation as a strategy, pos sib il ity or absurdity.