ABSTRACT
The first argument is that fairly coherent PPGs are a necessary condition for electoral accountability. Or, in its stronger version, representative democracy in parliamentary systems is party government (Katz 1987:2). A crucial element in Katz’s ‘partyness of government’ variable is the degree to which parties act cohesively to enact party policies (Katz 1987:7). This ‘mandate theory’ originated with the Westminster type of party government: a party elected on the basis of a programme, with a majority in parliament, has a mandate from the people to make its programme the official policy of the government (Ware 1987: ch. 7). In the next election the voters will judge the parties on their merits. How well have they followed up their election pledges, and how united was the party-in-government? What is the balance of elitism v. populism (or top-down v. bottom-up) in the representative ‘mode of operation’ of its party (Epstein 1967:316, 292)? The contribution of parties to democracy according to this argument is to serve as a channel of communication by connecting demands from the people to the government (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966), or-in another version-to organise a ‘linkage’ between electorate and government (Lawson 1980). The question for research on the PPGs is whether and how PPGs perform this ‘transmission-belt’ job between electorate and government. Do we need the PPGs at all for this task? Other kinds of democracy (with referenda, personal candidates, presidents) may of course also be ‘accountable’.
