ABSTRACT
Aggregate trade union membership is widely acknowledged to be the product of several interacting forces (Mason and Bain 1993). Change in the macro-economic environment or in the composition of the workforce can either fan or dampen employee demand for union representation. Employers can depress demand through policies of union suppression or substitution, while the institutions of collective industrial relations supported by state policy can further inhibit or promote unionization. The actions of unions themselves can also help determine the level of membership. It has been variously argued that the level of union membership is influenced by the commitment of national leaders to a policy of expansion (Undy et al. 1981), the level of investment in recruitment (Voos 1984), the adoption of “union building” tactics in recruitment campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 1997), and the wider adjustment of union policy, such that it is congruent with the needs of a changing workforce (Hyman 1999). Seemingly, unions can directly determine aggregate membership, at least in part, through the supply of organization and representation. They may also indirectly influence membership by shaping the policies of employers and government, thereby removing some of the potential obstacles to unionization where demand from workers exists. Even those who have stressed the economic determinants of union membership have acknowledged that union activity can contribute to the aggregate total (Bain and Price 1983).
