ABSTRACT
This book has addressed the relationship between internal institutional reform in the European Union and enlargement. Such reforms are important, as Dennis Mueller concludes, because as the Union increases its size, structural deficiencies are likely to prove more harmful to its ability to make decisions and to provide collective goods to its citizens. His concern is supported by the analysis by HansJörg Schmidt-Trenz and Dieter Schmidtchen, who show that the possible benefits of further extending a legal order, such as the acquis communautaire, depend on various factors and the extension is not necessarily a ‘better’ arrangement for existing and new members. Gerald Schneider shows how widening and deepening of the Union are connected in a non-linear way. He suggests that enlargement will most likely lead to the wish of some member states to loosen the collaboration, as some of the benefits of cooperation can no longer be obtained. Focusing on Council decision-making, Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger, as well as Jan-Erik Lane and Reinert Mæland, urge reducing the threshold for majority voting to avoid the Union’s ability to take decisions being substantially limited by the member states’ capacity to block. Lars Feld, Gebhard Kirchgässner and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann suggest introducing referenda at the European Union level, especially on the Union’s budget. Jordi Bacaria, Georgios Chortareas and Andreas Kyriacou propose alternative arrangements for the European System of Central Banks, which would improve monetary policymaking in the euro-zone in view of further enlargement. Finally, Friedrich Schneider argues that a European constitution is necessary in order to guarantee ‘a proper and efficient enlargement’. These findings make it clear that even after Nice a further debate on the Union’s institutional structure is required.
