ABSTRACT

The political development of the European Union has now reached the point where the governments and citizens of Europe are confronted with constitutional choices that raise issues of fundamental political principle. At one time commentators on the EU hoped that the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam would be the forum within which some of these issues could be addressed. In the event, despite a significant strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, the EU continues to present important unresolved issues of constitutional choice: the continuing democratic deficit; the lack of agreement about the functions that should be exercised at different levels of political organisation within Europe; controversy over the legitimacy of EU decision rules; and the design of structures of political representation. As we seek to show in this introduction, the Treaty of Amsterdam still leaves unresolved fundamental questions of political principle of the sort discussed in this volume. Enlargement, bringing with it the need to confront issues that were postponed at Amsterdam, will make these issues more, not less, serious.