ABSTRACT
The relevance of human factors to the safe operation of complex technical facilities was recognised several years ago (Meister, 1962, 1971; Turner, 1978). Since then, the introduction of appropriate measures to defend against the threat revealed by these findings has taken a circuitous and sometimes devious route. Initial intervention strategies focused on first-end action at the human-machine interface. The resulting progress has been remarkable, but some of the measures had side-effects. For instance, automation has increased the complexity of the systems involved (Bainbridge, 1987). More and more people have come to realise that the complex interaction of a plant’s organisation and the environment in which the plant is embedded may have a crucial influence on safety. In this context the importance of a sound safety culture has been emphasised in the last decade (INSAG, 1991). In order that this more comprehensive understanding of human factors could be introduced into intervention strategies that are relevant to the daily practice of the nuclear industry in Germany, research projects (Wilpert et al., 1994; Becker et al., 1995) were conducted jointly by the safety research unit of the Technical University (TU) of Berlin and the Institute of Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection (IKS) of TÜV Rheinland in Cologne. This chapter presents some of the key problems that we, the members of those research teams, encountered during the research project, as we tried to apply our scientifically convincing approach to a practical setting. The problems rooted in the political situation are illustrated, and the consequences of this situation demonstrated. The conclusion focuses on the undesired side-effects that the factors relating to the environment of an organisation may have on the organisation’s behaviour. Proposals are drafted to overcome at least some of the problems.
