Ever since the publication of Clifford Williams’ paper on “The Metaphysics of A- and B- Time” (1996), there has been an ongoing debate about whether or not there is a genuine metaphysical dispute between these two views and if so how, precisely, it is to be drawn. 1 With the increased popularity of presentism, the debate or lack of such between presentism and “eternalism” (the currently fashionable name for the B-theory) has taken center stage. 2 Since for some, “eternalism” is compatible with either the A- or the B-theory of time, the presentism/eternalism debate has reignited the original general question of how, if at all, A- and B-time are to be distinguished (Zimmerman 2005). The title of my paper is meant to signal that I too am going to enter into the question of the legitimacy of the dispute, but the limitations of this essay must be stated at the outset. I am not going to be debating these different views in the sense of giving arguments for and against the various gambits in the philosophy of time, 3 nor am I going to be directly concerned with the difference between A- and B-theories (or even, more specifically, presentism and eternalism) since I believe that the proper way to draw the lines in the metaphysical debate cuts across all those views. My primary purpose is rather to clarify a genuine debate and to indicate some of the ontological issues that are important for the future of the philosophy of time. To accomplish that goal I shall discuss a third view, the Russellian theory of time (hereafter “R-theory”), and distinguish it from A- and B-theories, including presentism and eternalism (at least in some of its commonly accepted forms), and defend it against mistaken formulations and misguided criticisms.