ABSTRACT
When we look at Popper’s writings, which extend over six decades of the twentieth century, we see a vast, complex and engaging tapestry. His refl ections on the physical sciences, ranging from the pre-Socratics to relativity theory and quantum physics is integrally and extensively woven through this philosophical tapestry. In this connection, whether we agree or not, we can all admire his elaborate, coherent, well developed philosophy of the physical sciences centred on problem solving and the deductive testing of theories conceived as bold conjectures which must be falsifi able. Also woven through this tapestry we see his later refl ections on metaphysics, with the emphasis on non-provable, non-falsifi able but arguable positions. However, these refl ections on metaphysics are neither as extensively nor as systematically elaborated as his refl ections on physics. Nonetheless his case for the arguability of a metaphysical position is evident in his own metaphysical commitment to realism in the context of his presentation of the realism-idealism debate.1
