ABSTRACT
The analytical object does not come about once and for all, as an epiphany, even though it may seem obvious as to why the object is defined as it is, and is often narrated as if it were a rather sudden realization. Nor can we identify a pre-set and fixed course of action that brings about an analytical object, although this should not prevent us from performing the certain sets of practices we associate with making analysis. The analytical object is rather the result of a series of adjustments and corrections (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 227). While it is pertinent of Pierre Bourdieu to remind us that the analytical object evolves, and to invite us to reflect upon how and why a particular object comes into being, it is however equally important not to portray this as a smooth process. The notion of series of adjustments and corrections may divert attention away from acknowledging that some adjustments and corrections have more profound effects than others on how the analytical object takes form. In my analysis of civil society in Turkey (Kuzmanovic 2012), two particular adjustments did indeed have profound effects on what the finite analysis came to be about. One was the analytical and methodological redefinition of civil society into an object of ethnographic inquiry, and the other was the analytical and theoretical reconceptualization of the relationship between civil society and agency. How these two adjustments came to the fore and why they became significant is what I explore in this chapter. I will do so by identifying the normative notions of a ‘good’ and ‘finite’ analysis that were implicit in my analytical endeavor, and show how these notions functioned as horizons of orientation and horizons of expectation thus shaping the character of my finite analysis.
