ABSTRACT
The debate in Europe and on Europe has, in large part, changed in nature since the 1970s. During the decade preceding the creation of the Common Market and during the fifteen years that followed the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the attention of pro-and anti-European activists, as well as that of the media and political commentators, was polarized over the methods or outcomes of the much-disputed integration. What should Europe do? Which countries should or could join in this shared adventure? Yet little reflection and discussion were devoted, even by the founding fathers, to the nature of this new creation and, in particular, to its compatibility with national political systems. The main preoccupation at the time focused on the question, at once symbolic and sensitive, of sovereignty, and everything unfolded as though the problem was exclusively one of a transfer of power from one level (state) to another (supranational). The nature of power and its use were not seen to be the order of the day. The institutional rhetoric of the 1950s expressed a clear decision to position itself, at least partially, outside the referential framework of the classic democratic model. For instance, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was rooted in a High Authority and, later, the European Economic Community (EEC) took shape through the Commission. These new institutions proceeded according to regulations and directives, not by legislative decisions. However, it would be unfair to the founders of the future European Union to suspect them of being indifferent to the democratic principle.
