ABSTRACT
Philosophy without theses According to G.E.M.Anscombe (1954:373), Wittgenstein once said of his later work: ‘Its advantage is that if you believe, say, Spinoza or Kant, this interferes with what you believe in religion; but if you believe me, nothing of the sort.’ Both theologians and philosophers, no doubt for a variety of reasons, would find this a strange remark. Many theologians would like to think that philosophy, properly introduced, strengthens and even provides intellectual foundations for their enterprise. Many philosophers, on the other hand, would think that philosophy’s interference with religious belief is such that it undermines it completely. And it is easy to think of other ways in which philosophy might interact with religion. What is this turn in the history of philosophy, then, which apparently allows the philosopher to say something about religion without encroaching upon it in any way, either to improve or discredit it?
