ABSTRACT
Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is probably the most well known and most widely discussed thesis in contemporary philosophy. It seems to me, however, that despite its widespread discussion both the content of the thesis and the arguments for it remain relatively unclear. I think the main reason for this unclarity is that the thesis characteristically takes two different forms: (a) an epistemological form, in which it concerns the relation between translation manuals and the possible evidence or data which we use to choose between such manuals, and (b) an ontological form, in which it concerns the relation between translation manuals and “the totality of facts” or “the whole truth about nature”— it is this latter form which is expressed by saying that there is no fact of the matter about correct translation. Because the indeterminacy thesis takes two different forms, it is difficult to evaluate arguments for it. Is a given argument an argument for indeterminacy in the first sense or the second sense? Do arguments for indeterminacy in the first sense support indeterminacy in the second sense? Etc.
