ABSTRACT

Since the publication of the Principles of Political Economy in 1817 it has been common to read of a sharp breakaway by Ricardo from Smithian methodology. An early statement of the contrast discerned is by Simonde de Sismondi who compared Smith’s view of political economy as ‘une science d’expérience’ with Ricardo’s speculations (1951 [1827], I:69-70). Statements to much the same effect appear in two important new works on classical economics-Soweil 1974:113-14 and O’Brien 1975:67.1

The presumed contrast between Smithian and Ricardian procedures is frequently related to Smith’s place within the Scottish Historical Schoolthat group of historians which includes Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, and John Millar-whose members, it is said, ‘were concerned to base their social and economic generalizations on firm historical facts, and were opposed to abstract speculation and conjecture’ (O’Brien 1975:66-7).2 More generally, it has been observed that ‘the idea of the progress of society can be described as the historical frame of reference of the Wealth of Nations’ (Forbes 1954:648).3 There is no comparable dimension in Ricardo’s Principles.