ABSTRACT
It is common knowledge that one of the spouses in a family may dominate the other. Nevertheless, in the economic literature dominance is an overlooked phenomenon. We examine the role of dominance as it affects how husband and wife allocate their time between contributions to a family-specific public good and market work. What is new in our approach to the economics of the family is its explicit focus on conflicting internal interests. The prevailing economic theory of the family regards the family as a unit of cooperationdecisions are made in consensus. Gary Becker, who is the most prominent representative of this approach, models family decision-making by positing a household utility function.1 This model gives many insights but there are limitations. First, since each family member’s preferences are not explicitly expressed, the intrafamily procedure for reaching the final, visible decision concerning, for example, labor supply and savings cannot be analyzed by the model, nor can decisions which have a certain degree of individuality attached to them, such as settlements at divorce.2 Also, the relative time allocation of spouses relies solely on comparative advantages. Second, all models of this kind assume that spouses follow what they agreed upon. However, several agreements concerning the conduct of family life (for example, the allocation of time) are not enforceable. Hence, opportunistic behavior cannot always be excluded.3
