ABSTRACT
This contribution sets out on the proposition that the probability of collective bargaining at the level of the European Union increases with the degree of structural uniformity between national industrial relations systems (Schmidt 1992). If the regulation and organisation of national systems are rooted in highly divergent principles, then the tasks and costs of European-level coordination will be so great as to diminish the likelihood of any focused supranational approach on the part of the individual national actors (trade unions, employers, governments). However, if national systems are broadly uniform the costs of coordination at Community-level will be both low and sustainable. An extensive degree of uniformity between national systems does not mean, however, that European-level collective bargaining will necessarily come about: it is simply, and merely, one important precondition. Moreover, this is a condition which does not apply only to the process of formulating and negotiating a claim but also, and in particular, to the process of ‘implementing the contract’ (i.e. collective agreements). If European collective agreements are to achieve their aim, they must be implemented throughout the EU (cf. Chapter 2). This will be easier where the differences between the implementing institutions are small.
