ABSTRACT
One of the most interesting aspects of McDowell s very interesting book is the way in which it locates the problems of late twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy within the historical development of the Western philosophical tradition.2 Beginning with an opposition between Coherentism and the Myth of the Given exemplified in the recent work of Donald Davidson,3 McDowell proceeds to frame his discussion in terms of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions, understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. McDowell’s basic idea is that we can satisfactorily overcome the opposition between Coherentism and the Myth of the Given only by recognizing, with Kant, that concepts and intuitions, understanding and sensibility, must be integrated together in every cognitive act or process-even in the mere intake of experiential content characteristic of sense perception. There is thus no room, according to McDowell, for either unconceptualized sensory input standing in no rational relation to conceptual thought (“intuitions without concepts are blind”) or purely intellectual thought operating independently of all rational constraint from sense experience (“thoughts without content are empty”).
