In pith and substance, refugee law is not immigration law . . . but rather a system for the surrogate or substitute protection of human rights.1

In this chapter, I examine the refugee as the object of surrogate protection. I explain how this seemingly simple construction is laden with ambiguities, and how use of this concept in interpretation of the Refugee Convention defi nition has shifted the refugee’s identity from a position whereby, as per the refugee defi nition in the 1951 Refugee Convention,2 a refugee is ‘a person who’ ‘is unable, or owing’ to fear of persecution, is ‘unwilling to avail himself ’ of the protection of the country of his nationality, to one whose entitlement to protection depends on the ability and willingness of the state (or its agents, or non-state actors) to provide protection.3 This shift in focus has implications: fi rst, for the meaning of ‘refugee protection’ and hence identity; second, for the practical burden and standard of proof in refugee law.