Introduction

One of the key tensions in the development of a ‘European foreign policy’ is the interplay between the national foreign policies of the EU member states and the ambitions for a common policy line agreed at the EU level. At first sight this juxtaposition is somewhat artificial as almost by definition there can be no ‘common’ line at the EU level without the prior existence of national foreign policies from which this commonality should spring. In addition, this tension is also perhaps surprising because at least in principle the ‘Grand Narrative’ of the 2000s in the EU has been towards increasing institutionalization and hence ostensibly also growing commonality in foreign policy at the European level (Smith 2008; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and its institutional innovations — the President of the European Council, the new High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) that has brought the external relations aspects of the Council and the Commission together — was specifically designed to facilitate the emergence of a more common and unified European foreign policy (Ashton 2010; see also Cameron 2012 and Missiroli 2010).