ABSTRACT
IF THE BREAKDOWN of democracy preoccupied political scientists in the 1970s and “transitions” preoccupied comparativists in the 1980s, then the “consolidation” and “deepening” of democracy became the favored theme of the 1990s. Von Mettenheim and Malloy (1998: 178-179) argued,
Th is relatively optimistic perspective has encouraged some Latin Americanists to apply analysis drawn from a school of comparativists called the new institutionalists . Th ese political scientists say the time has come to focus more attention “on the process whereby elected leaders, working through the institutions of democracy, make decisions” (Munck 2004: 437). Institutions are political arrangements, rules, or organizations that are valued for themselves as ways to process demands, resolve confl icts, or promote the general welfare of the population. Some are established through constitutions that defi ne the role of diff erent branches of government or lay out the major responsibilities of public entities. In Latin America, there exist so-called organic or semi-constitutional laws that are not formally codifi ed in the constitution, but that have a special status as foundational laws that can be changed only by
extraordinary majorities. For example, laws that govern taxation, rules for foreign investment, or electoral processes oft en have this status.
