ABSTRACT
Philosophical theories of knowledge have tended to stress normative approaches without considering their empirical realizability or political consequences. Sociological theories have suffered the reverse problem of capturing the empirical and ideological character of knowledge, but typically without offering guidance on how knowledge policy should be conducted. Social epistemology aims to consolidate the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of these two approaches. Multiculturalism is of special interest to the social epistemologist because it escapes the usual philosophical and sociological ways of understanding knowledge. It will become evident in what follows that I mean multiculturalism in a rather specific sense that entails my unqualified support. Multiculturalism is more than simply the recognition that there are distinct cultures, which would amount to little more than a “separate but equal” doctrine for the human condition. It further implies that these cultures stand in certain relationships to each other that may change as those same relationships unfold in time and space. Perhaps the epitome of my sense of multiculturalism is the political and legal debates surrounding “affirmative action” (Cahn 1995; Fuller 1999b, chap. 4). I associate this perspective with the “critical multiculturalism” defended in Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997.
