ABSTRACT
Since its birth in the 1870s, the Austrian tradition has always faced the problem of defining itself as a specific and identifiable school of thought, distinct from marginalism and later on from neoclassical economics. The whole story of the Austrian School is marked by internal tensions, ambiguities and misunderstandings that undermine its identity: from the outset, Menger had to emphasise the specificity of his approach in relation to Walrasian marginalism; Böhm-Bawerk, who presented himself as a faithful follower of the Austrian founder, elaborated a theory of capital and interest that Menger considered the biggest error ever committed; in the 1930s, Hayek and Mises clashed on methodological ground, the former firmly rejecting the excess of the apriorist approach and proposing instead some kind of falsificationist perspective; despite his contribution to the theory of economic development, Schumpeter was never considered a genuine Austrian author because of his admiration for the general equilibrium construct of Walras and his non-Hayekian cycle theory;1 and so on . . .
