ABSTRACT
An essay on the topic ‘philosophy of education’ might be expected to begin with a simple definition of the subject, followed by a delineation of its major branches of thought. Several writers have undertaken such a project in recent years (Chambliss, 1996; Ericson, 1992; Noddings, 1995; Phillips, 1994; Senchuk, 1995; Smeyers, 1994; Smeyers and Marshall, 1995). In reading these accounts, one finds that a central theme is the essentially contested status of what philosophy of education is (a point illustrated, much earlier on, in the collection What Is Philosophy of Education?, edited by Christopher Lucas in 1969). Indeed, proposing and arguing for competing conceptions of the field has been one of the reliable cottage industries for its scholars and an arena of debate over criteria for participation in the professional organisations, academic departments, and journals that take on the label (Burbules, 1991; Giarelli and Chambliss, 1991). The most striking characteristic of ‘philosophy of education’, then, has been that from the very first uses of the term the negotiation of what the field itself is has been one of its primary objects of preoccupation (see especially Maloney, 1985). Such debates have had a principled philosophical dimension, but have also had specific consequences for the inclusion and exclusion of potential participants.
