ABSTRACT
How are attitudes represented in human memory, and how are they changed after direct experiences or messages that contradict earlier opinions? In this chapter, the question of attitude representation and change is analyzed from a connectionist approach. This novel framework has been introduced in social psychology during the last decade, inspired by the increasing success of connectionism in cognitive psychology. Connectionist models offer a new perspective on diverse social psychological phenomena, including person impression formation (Smith & DeCoster, 1998; Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 2004), causal attribution (Read & Montoya, 1999; Van Overwalle, 1998), group biases (Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 2000; Van Rooy, Van Overwalle, Vanhoomissen, Labiouse, & French, 2003) and cognitive dissonance (Van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002; for an overview, see Read & Miller, 1998). A key difference from earlier models is that the connectionist architecture and processing mechanisms are founded on the neurological properties of the brain. This allows a view of the mind as an adaptive learning mechanism that develops an accurate mental representation of the world. Learning is modeled as a process of online adaptation of existing knowledge to novel information provided by the environment.
