ABSTRACT
A quasi-mathematical view would treat natural law as a body of theorems, any one of which would be deducible from higher order theorems and ultimately from self-evident axioms. But a system of rules for conduct, unlike a geometrical system, has to be interpreted. And though we can give reasons for particular prescriptions by referring to general rules, such rules do not determine their own application. When deciding on action according to rules, we have to decide into which category the given circumstances fit, or what amounts to the same thing, which of several competing rules is the one to apply here. In using proverbs, we often meet contradictions; for instance, 'Too many cooks spoil the broth' and 'Many hands make light work' are veiled prescriptions, which might be applied in appropriate circumstances-but we have to decide what these are. Anyone deciding according to rules, whether moral or legal, has to make choices of this sort.
