ABSTRACT
We have rather assumed, up till now, a general freedom to associate for sectional purposes. But we have shown, too, that some philosophers, like Rousseau, have been very suspicious of sectional associations, or, like Hobbes, have been positively hostile. Their attitudes were linked, however, with certain ideas about state sovereignty or moral supremacy which we have rejected. Nevertheless, the case for associative freedom needs to be examined. In this chapter we relate the general criterion implied in the notion of morality-respect for persons as sources of claims, and as morally autonomous beings-to the actual conditions of organized social action. Though it would be a mistake to say that freedom to associate for sectional purposes was, in a strict sense, entailed by such a general criterion, we believe that it can be supported by showing that people are more likely to be respected, and their claims receive due attention, if such a right is admitted in principle. Nevertheless, because sectional associations are authority structures, they may come into serious conflict with state authority. And because they often wield power, they may affect the liberty of others. In its capacity of umpire and coordinator, the state cannot leave them entirely to their own devices. On what principles can such conflicts be resolved?
