ABSTRACT

We use 'authority' in the de jure sense when we speak of someone in authority', or of 'the authorities'. The factual question, whether people do in fact fall in with his proposals, obey his commands, etc., is not immediately to the point. He is 'in authority' because a rule, or a system of rules, authorizes him to give orders, and constitutes for others a duty to obey, at any rate so long as the commander remains within his authority or competence. So long as the rule is generally respected authority de jure will tend to be also de facto, i.e. people will fall in with the official's suggestions because they recognize in him a man appointed and entitled to give orders; though they might not respect the man, they might yet respect his office. In a strictly voluntary association (if such a thing exists), a man might exercise a defacto authority to the extent that members respect the rules that confer on him a de jure authority; but against the man who rejects the rule he may have no remedy. But if an association is able to enforce a sanction, authority de jure may also be a * See Chapters I, 10, and II.