ABSTRACT
Philosophers of sport seem to have lived happily with the idea that the knowledge in sporting skills is knowing how. In traditional epistemology, knowing how does not qualify to be knowledge proper since knowledge is a question of whether a (propositional) belief is true and justified. Unless knowing how is a special case of knowing that, it is not knowledge. The argument for such an identification arises saying that a former expert in tennis has tennis know-how, although she cannot perform skillfully. If we do not need ability to perform a skill and still have know-how, it seems reasonable to say that know-how is a type of knowing that. With such a move, skills are perhaps not identical to know-how. Are we then left with the idea that there isn't any knowledge in sporting skills? If we stick with the idea that a fine forehand is indeed an able forehand, the question of what knowledge skills contain remains. This article aims to discuss and shed light on issues related between knowledge, knowing how, ability and skill. I will first give introduce the subject, and second present the knowledge argument. I will discuss diff erent accounts on how the knowledge argument treats knowing how with a special focus on the ability hypothesis. I will also present similarities in structure between knowing how and knowing that. Thirdly, I will discuss Stanley and Williamson's theory, where they argue that knowing how is nothing but knowing that. Stanley have collaborated with neuroscientist John Krakauer on issues relating knowing that and motor skills. Finally, the article will discuss knowledge in sporting skills in relation to Stanley and Krakauer's theory. If knowing how is nothing but knowing that, does this mean there isn't any knowledge in sporting skills? No. I will argue that skills contain both knowing that and knowing how, where the latter is a special case of knowing that. I will conclude that in addition to these two types of knowledge of the same kind, skills also contain ability/capacity and what I will call acuity. The only knowledge in skill though, is propositional.
